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Abstract 
  This paper combines two strands of the literature on inequality and distribution issues: the 
classical approach,  which insists on the division of society into classes characterized by different 
saving propensities, and the social conflict approach, which considers that inequality inflicts direct and 
indirect costs to economic development. An endogenous-growth model is studied. We assume that 
each consumer’s subjective discount factor is determined endogenously and depends on economic 
inequality  through  the  following  two  channels.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  positively  related  to  the 
individual  consumer’s  relative  wealth.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  negatively  affected  by  a  simple 
aggregate measure of social conflict. We show that, unlike models with exogenously given discount 
rates,  steady  state  equilibria  in  our  model  is  indeterminate  and  that  the  set  of  all  equilibria  is  a 
continuum which can be parameterized by a simple index of income inequality. The growth rate is 
ambiguously related to the inequality index. However, under some reasonable assumptions, the growth 
rate dependence on this index has an inverted U-shaped form. 
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1. Introduction 
  Despite the reliance of mainstream growth theory on ‘representative’ agents and long 
disregard of problems of inequality and distribution, societies are patently not homogeneous, 
whether  in  incomes,  wealth,  or  any  other  dimension.  A  concern  with  the  importance  of 
distribution was central to the thinking of classical economists such as David Ricardo and 
Karl Marx. However, up until recently, the mainstream economics profession seemed to have 
little  to  say  about  the  impact  that  the  distributions  of  income  and  wealth  might  have  on 
efficiency of an economy and its growth rate.  
  Some  interest  in  the  relationship  between  distribution  and  growth  restarted  in  the 
1950s with the work of Kaldor (1956) and Pasinetti (1962) and the last decade has seen its 
new  revival.  Existing  theories  about  the  effect  of  income  distribution  on  the  process  of 
development can be classified into two broad categories distinguished by their conflicting 
predictions. The classical approach originated by Smith (1776) and further interpreted and 
developed by Keynes (1920), Lewis (1954), Kaldor (1957), and Bourguignon (1981) suggests 
that inequality stimulates capital accumulation and thus promotes economic growth, whereas 
the  modern  approach  argues  in  contrast  that  for  sufficiently  wealthy  economies  equality 
stimulates investment in human capital and hence may enhance economic growth.  
  The modern paradigm is represented by three complementary approaches. The capital 
markets imperfections approach, developed by Galor and Zeira (1993), Aghion and Bolton 
(1997) and others, has argued that, in the presence of credit markets imperfection, equality in 
sufficiently  wealthy  economies  stimulates  investment  in  human  capital  and  in  individual 
specific  projects  and  hence  enhances  economic  growth.  The  political  economy  approach 
initiated by Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Bertola (1993) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) has 
argued  that  equality  diminishes  the  tendency  for  distortionary  redistribution  and  hence 
stimulates investment and economic growth.  
  Another strand of the literature emphasizes the importance of social conflict as a link 
between inequality and efficiency. Alesina and Perotti (1996) argue that inequality can lead to 
less  political  stability,  and  this  in  turn  can  lead  to  sub-optimal  investment  levels.  Social 
conflict  may  also  have  high  opportunity  costs  caused  by  violence.  Violence  levels  have 
recently increased sharply in both of the most unequal regions in the world (Latin America 
and sub-Saharan Africa), and in the one where its growth has been fastest (Eastern Europe, 
Russia and Central Asia). Fajnzylber et. al. (1998) documented these global trends, and find 
evidence to suggest that income inequality is significantly associated with violence levels, 
across countries. Bourguignon (2001) and others have documented the growing importance of 
the social and economic burden imposed on society by this rising violence, both in terms of 
the direct costs in lives and medical resources, and in terms of the opportunity costs of (both 
public and private) resources diverted from other activities towards preventing and fighting 
crime. 
  This paper proposes an endogenous-growth model combining the classical approach 
and the approach that considers social conflict and socio-political instability as links between 
inequality and development. This model is based on the following twofold assumption.  
  First, it is assumed that the subjective discount  factor of a consumer is not given 
exogenously but is determined endogenously. When Uzawa (1968) noted that in an economy 
populated by infinitely-lived agents with different time-preference rates, the entire capital 
stock will eventually be owned by the most patient agent, he cast doubt on the assumption of 
a constant rate of time preference and assumed that a higher level of consumption increases 
the subjective discount rate (this assumption is needed for stability). Blanchard and Fischer 
(1989) argue, however, that this assumption “is difficult to defend a priori; indeed, we usually   3 
think it is the rich who are more likely to be patient” (p. 73). In this paper, we assume that the 
rich are more patient than the poor. In this respect our model agrees closely with a model 
developed  by  Schlicht  (1975)  and  Bourguignon  (1981)  and  does  not  contradict  to  the 
empirical evidence showing (see, e.g., Browning and Lusardi (1996) and Soulels (1999)) that 
the marginal propensity to consume is substantially higher for consumers with low wealth or 
low income than for consumers with high wealth or income. Our model is also akin to several 
dynamic  macroeconomic  models  with  heterogeneous  consumers  (see  e.g.  Becker  (1980), 
Michel and Pestieau (1998), Smetters (1999), Mankiw (2000)), but, unlike those models, we 
assume that all consumers are identical in their exogenous parameters. 
  Secondly, it is assumed that inequality increases the impatience of economic agents. 
The extremely simplified reasoning behind this assumption is as follows. Income inequality 
increases social discontent and the probability of coups, revolutions, mass violence, etc. (see 
Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Perotti (1996) for empirical evidence). For simplicity, we can 
reduce all risks emerging from high income inequality to the threat of total collapse of the 
ordinary  economic  order  with  absolutely  unpredictable  consequences  for  consumers.  It 
follows that when solving his utility maximization problem, a consumer should foresee and 
take into account the consequences of his  saving and consumption decisions only until a 
possible  economic  collapse,  after  which  an  absolutely  new  economic  order  will  be 
established. This is true irrespective of whether this new order will be better or worse than 
before the collapse. Thus, as the probability of collapse increases, the effective discount factor 
of each consumer decreases.  
  We  show  that  unlike  models  with  exogenously  given  discount  rates,  steady-state 
equilibria are indeterminate in the sense that the set of all equilibria is a continuum that can be 
parameterized by an index of inequality. The dependence of the growth rate on this index is 
not unambiguous. However, under some reasonable additional assumption, this dependence 
has an inverted U-shaped form.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the technology 
of  production  and  the  firm's  problem.  Section  3  presents  the  consumers'  preferences  and 
maximization problem including the hypothesis on the endogenous formation of patience. 
Section 4 studies the balanced-growth competitive equilibrium maintaining the probability of 
collapse exogenous. This probability is endogenized in section 5 and the link between growth 
and inequality is analyzed. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 The firms 
  Technology is given by a production function 
  Y=F(K,AL), 
where  Y  is  output,  K  is  the  capital  stock,  L  is  the  input  of  labor,  and  A  is  the  state  of 
technology.  The  production  function  F:
2
+    →ℜ+  is  assumed  to  be  continuous,  concave, 
homogeneous  of  degree  one  and  continuously  differentiable  on  int
2
+   .  Technological 
progress  is  assumed  to  be  Harrod-neutral  and  AL  is  interpreted  as  effective  labor.  For 
simplicity, the capital stock fully depreciates during one time period. 
  We conduct the analysis with an endogenous-growth model. This model is based on 
the following 
  Assumption E1. A=K/k L, where k >0 is exogenously given.   4 
  Borissov and Lambrecht (2005) show that the analysis can also be conducted with an 
exogenous-growth model, where the state of technology grows at an exogenously given rate 
of growth. 
  Assumption E1 is borrowed from Frankel (1962) and Romer (1986). It specifies the 
class of so called AK-models. In what follows all markets are assumed competitive. The firms 
maximize their profits taking prices as given. This means that they hire the services of labor 
and capital up to the point where their marginal products equal their respective prices. In 
intensive terms, therefore the relationships between the capital intensity of effective labor, 
k=K/AL, the interest rate, r, and the wage rate earned by one unit of effective labor, w, are the 
following: 
  r=f ′(k)–1, w=f(k)–f′(k)k, 
where 
  f(k)≡F(k,1) 
is the production function in intensive form. Since, by E1, k=k , we have r=r  and w=w , 
where r  and w  are determined by 
  r =f( k )–1,  w =f( k )–f′( k ) k . 
  Time t is discrete. 
 
3 The consumers 
3.1 The objective and the constraints 
  There is a continuum of consumers. The population size is normalized to unity, L=1. 
  Each consumer is endowed at each time with one unit of labor. It should be noticed 
that, given A, the real wage rate earned by one unit of labor is Aw . Given the initial level of 
his savings at time t=–1,  1 ˆ  s ≥0, at time t=0 the consumer solves the following maximization 
problem: 
  max{ 
 
=0 ) (
t t
t c u    | s–1= 1 ˆ  s , ct+st=(1+ r )st–1+ w At,  
                                                            st–1≥0, t=0,1,…},  (1) 
where At, ct and st are respectively the state of technology, consumption and savings of the 
consumer in period t, β∈(0,1) is his discount factor and  
  u(c)=log c. 
It should be emphasized that in our models there are borrowing constraints, st≥0, t=0,1,…, so 
that future income cannot be discounted to the present
3. Our model may be considered as a 
model of sequential generations with altruism
4. 
  We will consider stationary solutions only. Suppose we are a given constant over time 
rate of technological progress, g. Let us also assume A0=1 so that 
  At=(1+g)
t, t=0,1,… . 
                                                             
3   Nothing would be changed to our results if we relaxed this non-negativity constraint on saving and 
allow for some limited borrowing possibilities. 
4   We leave it for the reader to generalize them to the case of overlapping generations with altruism 
and/or to the case of felicity functions with constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution.   5 
Then problem (1) can be rewritten as follows: 
  max{ 
 
=0 ) (
t t
t c u    | s–1= 1 ˆ  s , ct+st=(1+ r )st–1+ w (1+g)
t, 
                                                                 st–1≥0, t=0,1,…}.  (2) 
The first-order conditions for this problem are  
  ct+1≥β(1+ r )ct (= if st>0), t=0,1,... .  (3) 
We  focus  on  the  solutions  to  this  problem  that  grow  at  the  same  rate  as  the  rate  of 
technological progress, g. 
  Definition.  Given  β and  g>–1,  a  steady-growth  consumer  optimum  is  a  solution 
(  
 1 t s ,ct*)t=0,1,… to (2) at some  1 ˆ  s ≥0 such that savings   
 1 t s  and consumption ct* grow at the 
rate g: 
   
+1 t c /ct*=st*/  
 1 t s =1+g, t=0,1,… . 
  We now characterize steady-growth consumer optima. The following lemma follows 
from definitions and first-order conditions (3). 
  Lemma  1.  Suppose  that  g∈(–1,r )  and  β  are  given.  A  steady-growth  consumer 
optimum (  
 1 t s ,ct*)t=0,1,… exists if and only if 1+g≥β(1+r ). It is characterized by 
   
 1 t s =(1+g)
ts–1 and ct*=(1+g)
tc0, t=0,1,…,  (4) 
where the pair (s–1,c0) satisfies 
  s–1≥0 and c0= w +( r –g)s–1.   (5) 
If 1+g=β(1+r ), then s–1>0. If 1+g>β(1+r ), then s–1=0 and hence c0=w . ￿  
 
  We now turn to the examination of the key assumption of this article. 
 
3.2 The endogenous formation of the consumer's discount factor 
  Our  main  assumption  is  that  the  formation  of  the  effective  discount  factor  of  a 
consumer, β, takes place endogenously. 
  In models with homogenous consumers with exogenously given discount factors, the 
relationship between the equilibrium steady-growth rates of interest and growth,  r  and g, is 
the following: 
  1+g=β(1+ r ).   (6) 
where g is endogenous and r  considered as given. 
  The same is true if we consider models with heterogeneous consumers varying only in 
their discount factors. The only difference is that, in this case, in (6) β is not the discount 
factor shared by all consumers, but is the discount factor of the most patient consumers. 
Moreover, in steady state equilibria, all the capital belongs to the most patient consumers. 
This was noted by Uzawa (1968) and Becker (1980) for the case of exogenous growth and 
can easily be proved for the case of an AK technology.   6 
  In this paper, we explore the implications for growth and inequality of the following 
assumption: 
  Assumption E2. The effective discount factor of a consumer, β, is determined by 
  β=(1–p)ϕ 
where 
(i)  ϕ is an individual-specific subjective discount factor, increasing in the individual 
relative income and 
(ii)  p is a social objective magnitude reflecting a detrimental effect of social tension 
and  political  instability  on  the  economy;  this  magnitude  is  supposed  to  be 
increasing (or at least non-decreasing) in some measure of income inequality. 
  Thus, ϕ is supposed to be an increasing function of the individual’s relative income. 
We measure the latter by the ratio of his personal income to per capita income. By personal 
income we mean, as usually, the amount a person could have spent whilst maintaining the 
value of his wealth intact, i.e.  r s+w A, where s are his personal savings. As for per capita 
income, it is given by A(f(k )–k ). Hence, the individual relative income is  
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and, following our assumption: 
  ϕ=ϕ    
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k k f
w A s r
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/
, 
where ϕ:[1,∞)→(0,1) is an increasing and continuous function. The results of the paper would 
not change if we assumed that the subjective discount factor is an increasing function of some 
other measure of relative well-being, for example, of relative consumption or felicity. 
  Contrary to ϕ, the social magnitude p is common to all consumers that are assumed to 
be identical in their exogenous parameters. If we assume that all consumers are risk neutral, 
this magnitude may be interpreted as the probability of occurrence of a major episode of 
disruptive violence, hurting the property rights system. We shall specify later the kind of 
inequality measure that we choose as the argument of the p function.  
  The intuition behind our assumption is that the degree of impatience of an individual 
depends not only his personal position in society but also on the general threat on property 
rights of social disorders, tensions, generated by wealth inequality. This general threat equally 
concerns all the individuals independently of their relative position in the economy. As a 
consequence, the values of ϕ are different for consumers with different incomes, whereas p is 
the same for all consumers
5. 
  Under our assumption the individual’s discount factor reads 
  β=(1–p)ϕ    
 
 
   
 
 
 
+
k k f
w A s r
) (
/
, t=0,1,… .  (7) 
                                                             
5  Nothing would be changed in the results if, instead, we assumed that inequality inflicts losses to global 
output in a proportional fashion. In such a setting, through the inducted violence levels, inequality would put a 
wedge between potential output F(K,AL)and actual output zF(K,AL), with z the fraction of output forgone 
because of violence levels.   7 
We  continue  focusing  on  stationary  solutions
6  and  re-write  the  steady-growth  consumer 
optimum by substituting the individual’s discount factor with its definition in (7).  
  Definition. Given A0  and g>–1, a consistent steady-growth consumer optimum is a 
solution (  
 1 t s ,ct*)t=0,1,… to (2) at some  1 ˆ  s ≥0 and at  
  β=(1–p)ϕ    
 
 
   
 
 
 
+  
k k f
w A s r
) (
/ ˆ 0 1  
such that savings   
 1 t s  and consumption ct* grow at the rate g: 
   
+1 t c /ct*=st*/  
 1 t s =1+g, t=0,1,… . 
  To clarify this definition, it should be noted that since the state of technology grows at 
the same rate g as consumption and savings, 
  At+1/At=1+g, t=0,1,…, 
we have 
  β=(1–p)ϕ
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+  
 
k k f
w A s r t t
) (
/ 1 , t=0,1,… . 
The following lemma follows from Lemma 1 and our assumptions. 
  Lemma 2. Suppose that A0, g∈(–1,r ) and p are given. The sequence (  
 1 t s ,ct*)t=0,1,… is 
a consistent steady-growth consumer optimum if and only if (i) it follows the path defined by 
the pair (c0,s–1) in equations (4) and (5) and (ii) the following inequality holds: 
  1+g≥(1–p)ϕ     
 
 
   
 
 
 
+  
k k f
w A s r
) (
/ 0 1 (1+ r )  (8) 
with a strict inequality if s–1=0 (in this case c0=w ) and with equality if s–1>0 (in this case 
c0=w +(r –g)s–1). We  shall  say  that  the  pair  (c0,s–1)  characterizes  the  steady-growth 
consumer optimum (  
 1 t s ,ct*)t=0,1,….￿  
 
4 The balanced-growth competitive equilibrium with a constant p 
  It  follows  from  the  discussion  in  the  previous  section  that  on  balanced-growth 
competitive equilibria there can be at most two types of individuals: those constrained on their 
savings, who spend all their wages for consumption, and those unconstrained, who contribute 
to capital accumulation.  
                                                             
6   If we considered non-stationary solutions we would face the issue of time inconsistency. Indeed, for 
any given distribution of income, the objective function of each consumer is a well-defined concave function. 
However, if we tried to characterize a consumer optimum starting from an arbitrary chosen starting point, we 
would end up in the following issue. The discount factor accepted by a consumer at some time would not be 
equal to the discount factor of the same consumer accepted previously. This is due to the change in ϕ.  The 
consumer's objective function changes over time. This implies that the optimal plan chosen at time t1 need not be 
optimal as of time t2. Borissov (2005) studies non-stationary solutions to this problem.    8 
  It is important to stress the consequence of this result for the analysis of competitive 
equilibria. One can conceive as many equilibria as the number of alternative ways to share the 
population in these two types. 
  Agents of the first type will be denoted by the subscript h and agents of the second 
type by the subscript l. Since the former are wealthier than the latter, they will be called the 
rich and the poor respectively (following Mankiw (2000), they might be called savers and 
spenders). We denote by σ the fraction of the rich in the population and by 1–σ the fraction of 
the poor. 
  Let us give a formal definition of a balanced-growth competitive equilibrium. As a 
first step, we will consider that the parameter p is given. It will appear that this equilibrium 
depends on the fraction σ  of the rich in the population. 
  Definition. Given the normalized population size, L=1, the initial capital stock K0=k  
(and  hence  A0=1)  and  the  parameter  p,  a  balanced-growth  competitive  equilibrium  is  a 
sequence {(  
 1 ,t l s ,  
t l c , ), (  
 1 ,t h s ,  
t h c , ), Kt*, At*, Yt*}t=0,1,2,… such that  
(i)  all  individual  decisions,  i.e.  consumptions  and  savings  of  the  poor  and  the  rich, 
(  
 1 ,t l s ,  
t l c , )t=0,1,2,…, (  
 1 ,t h s ,  
t h c , )t=0,1,2,…, are consistent steady-growth consumer optima 
with some rate of growth g*, 
(ii)  aggregate variables, i.e. the aggregate capital stock, the state of technology and the 
aggregate output, Kt*, At*, Yt*, grow at the same rate g* and 
(iii)  at (constant over time) equilibrium prices r*=r  and w*=w , all markets clear and, 
especially, on the capital market, we have 
  Kt*=σ*  
 1 ,t h s +(1–σ*)  
 1 ,t l s  ⇔ Kt*=σ*  
 1 ,t h s , t=0,1,2,… .  (9) 
where σ* is one share of the rich in the population out of an infinite number of alternative 
shares σ. 
  Given the parameter p, the initial conditions and the equilibrium prices, a balanced-
growth competitive equilibrium, as defined here above, is fully characterized by the tuple 
{(sh*,сh*), (sl*,сl*), k*, w*, r*, σ*, g*}, where (sh*,сh*) and (sl*,сl*) are the pairs characterizing 
consistent steady-growth consumer optima of the rich and the poor at A0=1 and g=g*, k* is 
the constant over time capital intensity of effective labor, i.e., k*=Kt*/At*L, t=0,1,…, σ* is the 
equilibrium share of the rich in the population and g* is the equilibrium rate of growth. 
  Among all these variables, the following ones are easy to determine: 
  k*= k ,  from E1 
  sl*=0, сl*= w ,  from Lemma 2, zero savings case. 
  We obtain the expression of equilibrium saving of rich individuals, sh*, as follows: at 
any time period, the stock of capital is formed by the previous period savings: 
   
+1 t K =σ*  
t h s , , t=–1,0,1,… .   
At the same time by (4) we have 
   
t h s , =(1+g*)
t+1  
h s , t=–1,0,1,… .   9 
Since L=1 and At*=(1+g*)
t, t=0,1,…, we get 
  k =k*=
L A
K
t
t
 
 
+
+
1
1 = 1
1
*) 1 (
*) 1 ( *
+
+
+
  +
t
h
t
g
s g  
=σ*  
h s . 
Thus, equilibrium saving of the rich individuals writes: 
   
h s =k /σ*. 
As for сh*, it is a simple function: of the equilibrium wage rate and the interest rate, and of the 
following two variables: g* and sh*: 
  сh*= w +( r –g*)sh*,   from Lemma 2, positive savings case. 
  We are left now with the determination of σ*and g*. There remains only one equation: 
the consumer’s first-order condition (3) with equality, which implies: 
     
 
 
   
 
 
 
+
  = +
k k f
w k r
p g
) (
* /
) 1 ( * 1
 
  (1+ r ).  (10) 
  Let the relative income of a rich individual, i.e. the argument of the function ϕ in 
equation (10), be denoted by η≥1, a function of σ*: 
  η(σ*)=
k k f
w k r
 
+
) (
* / 
. 
Then (10) can be re-written as follows: 
  1+g*=(1–p)ϕ(η(σ*))(1+ r )  (11) 
  The following lemma says that, for a given p, the set of balanced growth competitive 
equilibria, is a continuum (cf. Borissov (2002)). It follows from Lemma 2. 
  Lemma 3. Suppose that p is given exogenously. Then there exists an infinite number 
of balanced growth equilibria, i.e. there exists an infinite number of pairs (σ*, g*) which 
satisfy (11). In particular, the set of equilibrium values of the growth rate is the interval 
[g′,g′′), where g′  and g′′ are given by 
  1+g′=(1–p)ϕ(1)(1+ r ), 1+g′′=(1–p)ϕ(∞)(1+ r ).￿  
  Note  that,  like  in  models  with  a  representative  consumer,  any  balanced  growth 
equilibrium satisfies the modified golden rule: 
  1+g*=β(1+ r ), 1+ r =f′( k ). 
Unlike  most  models  with  a  representative  consumer,  β  is  not  given  exogenously,  but  is 
formed  endogenously.  Moreover,  this  β  is  not  the  discount  factor  of  the  representative 
consumer,  but  the  effective  discount  factor  of  only  one  group  of  consumers,  the  rich.  It 
depends on the relative income of this group and hence on the proportion between the number 
of the rich and the number of the poor. This dependence is such that the smaller the fraction of 
the rich in the population, the larger the equilibrium rate of growth. Indeed, after substitution 
of sh*=k /σ*, the equilibrium relative income of the rich becomes: 
  η=  
 
 
  +1
*
,     10 
where α is the share of capital income in national income: 
 
k k f
k r
 
=
) (
     
It follows that equation (11) can be re-written as follows: 
  1+g*=(1–p)ϕ  
 
 
 
 
    +  
 
 
1
*
(1+ r ). 
Therefore, given p, the equilibrium rate of growth g* increases as the share of the rich in the 
population σ* decreases. 
 
5. The competitive balanced-growth equilibrium with an endogenous p 
  To relax our previous assumption that p is given exogenously, we need to specify how 
to measure inequality and how does p depend  on this measure. There are many ways of 
measuring inequality, all of which have some intuitive or mathematical appeal. Cowell (1995) 
contains details of at least 12 summary measures of inequality. For example, we could take 
the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality. However, since we are interested only in 
balanced growth equilibria, our task becomes simpler since we know that, given p, at any 
balanced growth equilibrium the population is divided into at most two classes, the rich and 
the poor. In such a context we can take as an index of inequality the relative income of a rich 
consumer, 
k k f
w s r h
 
+  
) (
.  
  It should be noted that this index is equivalent to the Gini coefficient as a measure of 
inequality in equilibria in the sense that they represent the same inequality ordering over the 
set of distributions of income between the two classes. Indeed, let {(sh*,сh*), (sl*,сl*), k*, w*, 
r*, σ*, g*} be the vector which characterize a balanced-growth competitive equilibrium. The 
Lorenz curve characterizing the income distribution in this equilibrium is presented on Fig. 1. 
It is not difficult to check that the Gini coefficient corresponding to this Lorenz curve is  
α(1–σ*). The share of capital in relative income, α, appears on the graph. We know that σ* is 
inversely related with  
  η(σ*)=
k k f
w s r h
 
+  
) (
.  
Therefore, the Gini coefficient increases as η(σ*) increases. It will be convenient for us to 
measure inequality by means of η(σ*). 
  To  give  a  general  definition  of  balanced  growth  equilibrium,  let  us  specify  our 
assumption on the formation of p and assume that 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+  
=
k k f
w s r
p p
h
) (
 
where p:[1,∞)→[0,1) is a continuous non-decreasing function. 
  The  formal  definition  of  a  balanced-growth  competitive  equilibrium  with  an 
endogenous parameter p is similar to the one given in the previous section with the following 
equation defining the equilibrium value of p, p*:   11 
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Similarly to the previous section discussion, a balanced-growth competitive equilibrium is 
fully characterized by a similarly determined tuple {(sh*,сh*), (sl*,сl*), k*, w*, r*, σ*, g*}. The 
examination of the consumer’s first-order condition with equality allow us to characterize the 
equilibrium values σ*and g* with an endogenous p*=p(η(σ*)):  
  1+g*=(1–p(η(σ*)))ϕ(η(σ*))(1+ r ) 
with η(σ*)≥1. Define the function ψ:[1,∞)→(0,1) by 
  ψ(η)=(1–p(η))ϕ(η) 
and present the equilibrium rate of growth g* as a function of η: 
  g*=ψ(η)(1+ r )–1 
  The following theorem follows from definitions and Lemma 3. 
  Theorem.  There  exists  an  infinite  number  of  balanced  growth  equilibria  with 
endogenous value of p, i.e. there exists an infinite number of pairs (σ*, g*) satisfying 
  g*=ψ(η(σ*))(1+ r )–1. 
Along this equilibrium path, variables   
 1 ,t l s ,   
t l c , ,   
 1 ,t h s ,   
t h c , , Kt*, At* and Yt* grow at the rate 
g*. ￿  
  This theorem says that in our model, like in the model proposed by Borissov (2002), 
the set of equilibria is a continuum. Moreover, this set can be parameterized by a simple index 
1–σ*  σ* 
Figure 1. Lorenz curve 
1–α 
The Lorenz curve   12 
of  inequality,  η.  The  dependence  of  the  growth  rate  on  η  is  in  general  ambiguous. It  is 
completely determined by the shape of the function ψ(η), which in its turn depends on the 
shapes of p(η) and ϕ(η). By the moment we have assumed no more than that the functions 
p:[1,∞)→(0,1) and ϕ:[1,∞)→(0,1) are monotonically increasing and continuous. At the same 
time it is not unreasonable to assume in addition that as η increases, ψ(η) first increases, 
peaks, and then decreases. Indeed, one might expect that ϕ(η) is a concave function having a 
noticeable positive slope when η is sufficiently small and getting more and more flat as η as 
goes up. As for p(η), one is inclined to think that it is zero or close to zero when η is 
sufficiently small, then there is an interval on which it goes up sufficiently steeply and then 
asymptotically p(η) converges to some positive number (≤1). If on the interval where p(η) 
goes up fast, ϕ(η) is sufficiently flat, then ψ(η) and therefore the dependence of economic 
development on inequality has an inverted U-shaped form. 
  To be more precise, suppose that the functions ϕ(η) and p(η) are twice continuously 
differentiable, that ϕ(η) is concave (ϕ′′(η)<0, η>0, see Fig. 2) and that there is an η1>0 such 
that  p(η)  is  convex  on  the  interval  [0,η1]  and  concave  on  [η1,∞)  (p′′(η)>0  for  0<η<η1, 
p′′(η)<0 for η>η1, see Fig. 3). Then the function ψ(η) is concave (ψ′′(η)<0) on the interval 
[0,η1].  
 
 
  If, in addition, we suppose that 
  ψ′(η)<0, η>η1,  (12) 
then  the  function  ψ(η)  reaches  its  maximum  at  some  ηmax<η1  and,  moreover,  ψ(η)  is 
increasing on (0,ηmax) and decreasing on (ηmax,∞) (see Fig. 4). It remains to note that the 
following conditions are sufficient for (12) to hold: 
  1–p(η1)<ϕ(η1), 
  ϕ′(η)<p′(η), η>η1. 
 
η 
ϕ(η) 
1 
Figure 2. The shape of ϕ(η) 
η1   13 
 
Casting a glance on Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, the reader would agree that the first of these inequalities 
looks quite reasonable. As for the second one, though it looks somewhat peculiar, it does not 
seem to be extremely unreasonable.  
 
 
 
6. Conclusion  
  In this paper, an endogenous-growth model with endogenous discounting has been 
constructed. All consumers are identical in their exogenous parameters. Our main assumption 
is that when maximizing his discounted utility ∑tβ
tu(ct), where u(c)=log c, a consumer forms 
his  effective  discount  factor  β  endogenously  by  computing  β=(1–p)ϕ,  where  ϕ  is  his 
subjective discount factor and p is the probability of full collapse of the economy during one 
time  period. The  subjective  discount  factor  is  a  monotonically  increasing  function  of  the 
relative  well-being  of  the  consumer  and  p  is  a  monotonically  increasing  function  of 
inequality.  We  have  introduced  p  to  reflect  the  empirically  supported  observation  that 
inequality can lead to less political stability and hence more uncertainty the consumers bear. 
η 
p(η) 
Figure 3. The shape of p(η) 
0  η1 
1 
Figure 4. The shape of ψ(η) 
ψ(η) 
η 
η1 
1 
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  We have shown that, unlike models with exogenously given discount rates, there is a 
continuum of steady-state equilibria. This is because the population is divided in equilibria 
into  the  rich  and  the  poor  and,  what  is  important,  the  division  cannot  be  considered  as 
exogenous  since  all  consumers  are  identical  in  their  exogenous  parameters.  The  set  of 
equilibria  can  be  parameterized  by  a  simple  index  of  income  inequality.  In  general,  the 
dependence of  economic development on this index is ambiguous. However, under some 
reasonable assumption it has an inverted U-shaped form.  
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